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WHY JACK BALKIN IS DISGUSTING
Andrew Koppelman*
Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin didn’t win friends when he
announced that (1) he is now a constitutional originalist and (2)
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
1
right to abortion. His claim to membership in the originalist club
brought forth a small army of eager bouncers, who were sure
that originalism couldn’t possibly defend the paradigmatic
2
departure from the Constitution’s original meaning.
Balkin has indeed posed a radical challenge to the vision of
law that drives many originalists—more radical than he is willing
to admit. His theory is in such deep tension with a commonly
held vision of the rule of law that his argument is, to put the
point precisely, disgusting. But that doesn’t mean that he is
wrong.
***
Balkin argues that the best version of originalism is based,
not upon the way in which the framing generation would have
expected the text to be applied, but rather upon the public
meaning of the text. The Fourteenth Amendment enacts
principles of equal citizenship. Those principles are violated if

*
John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University. Thanks to Jack Balkin, Shari Diamond, Peter DiCola, Eugene
Kontorovich, Martha Nussbaum, Jim Pfander, Richard Posner, Richard Primus, Steven
D. Smith, and Larry Solum for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007) [hereinafter Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter
Constitutional Redemption].
2. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old Time Originalism 11 (San Diego Legal
Studies Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1150447 (“Balkin’s acceptance of originalism may seem surprising,
given his general tendencies and preferred conclusions: it is almost as if Christopher
Hitchens were to announce that he has become a born again Christian.”). I have had
conversations with many colleagues, both originalist and nonoriginalist, who are
confident that Balkin has got to be kidding.
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the state uses women’s capacity for pregnancy as a basis for
assigning them a second class status or denying them liberty.
Originalism, Balkin argues, is not inconsistent with the idea
of a living constitution, because in practice the meaning of
constitutional principles shifts over time. Some constitutional
terms, such as “equal protection,” are intentionally abstract,
leaving the specification to be worked out by later generations.
Mobilized social movements, invoking their own interpretations
of those texts, play a legitimate role in determining which
3
specification will ultimately prevail. The constitutional
protection of sex equality, for example, is the consequence of the
feminist movement of the 1970s, which changed the mind of the
public in a way that eventually was reflected in the interpretation
4
of the Constitution. The triumph of gun rights in District of
5
6
Columbia v. Heller is another example.
Some originalists have disputed Balkin’s specific argument
about abortion, but that disagreement doesn’t explain the
7
scandal that Balkin has provoked. The real issue is the
suggestion that originalism is capacious enough to support this
result. The idea that social movements shape constitutional law
is particularly distressing to originalists, who are committed to
the idea that the Constitution’s meaning does not shift over time.
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport write, “it is a little
difficult to see what is left of a recognizable originalism, not to
mention the amendment process, if social movements have such
substantial discretion to apply constitutional provisions as they
8
see fit.” Steven Calabresi and Livia Fine claim that Balkin’s
originalism “substitutes the rule of engaged social movements
9
for the rule of law.”
3. Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 305, 308–09; Constitutional
Redemption, supra note 1, at 456–57, 491, 493–6, 504–11.
4. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 549, 574, 582 (2009).
5. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
6. Balkin, supra note 4, at 584.
7. My interest here is that scandal, not Balkin’s specific argument, which I won’t
discuss further except to note that I’m sympathetic to the kind of move he is making. See
Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor, Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion,
in PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ABOLITIONISM AND ITS
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Alexander Tsesis ed., forthcoming 2010); Andrew
Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 480 (1990).
8. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 381 (2007).
9. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 687 (2009).
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These charges draw blood only if there is a feasible
alternative to the world contemplated by Balkin—an originalism
that purges adjudication of discretion and the vagaries of
political change.
Balkin’s argument is both descriptive and normative. The
descriptive part is an account of how constitutional
interpretation is done in the United States—how constitutional
interpreters in this culture make their way from the spectacularly
vague commands of “equal protection” and “due process” to
determinate legal outcomes. The normative part pronounces this
process good. Like so many liberal legal theorists in the age of
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, Balkin is a stodgy defender
of the status quo.
Putting it this way, however, understates the radicalism of
his conservatism. His earlier writings imply that it is simply
impossible for constitutional law to have the fixity and
determinacy that his critics long for. Constitutional interpreters
10
are condemned to be free.
***
The giddy vertigo implicit in Balkin’s theory is made clearer
11
in his earlier book, Cultural Software —a book he has not so
much as mentioned for several years now, for reasons we will
consider shortly. Cultural Software ambitiously seeks to
synthesize evolutionary biology, hermeneutics, semiotics,
anthropology, psychology, linguistics, sociology, and many other
disciplines into a unified theory of ideology.
Following the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins,
Balkin argues that the basic units of thought are “memes,”
contagious ideas, traditions, styles, and behaviors that manage to
get themselves transmitted from one mind to another.
Handshakes, melodies, clichés, styles of dress are all memes;
they “encompass all the forms of cultural know-how that can be
12
passed to others through . . . imitation and communication.”
These are combined, in a necessarily ad hoc and untidy way, into
the “abilities, associations, heuristics, metaphors, narratives, and
10. The phrase “condemned to be free” is Sartre’s. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE,
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 632 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956). Balkin’s affinity with
existentialism is made clear in J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1629–30 (1990).
11. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998).
12. Id. at 43.
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capacities that we employ in understanding and evaluating the
13
social world.”
How is it that given memes manage to replicate themselves
over time? Balkin suggests that there is no single answer to this
question. The difference between a meme and a gene is that
biologists have converged on a single account of what a gene is
and how it replicates itself. Memes, on the other hand, replicate
themselves in a bewildering variety of ways. The tune “Three
Blind Mice” manages to perpetuate itself from one generation to
the next; so does the practice of brushing teeth; but the
mechanisms are different.
Sometimes these heterogeneous mechanisms are mutually
reinforcing. The persistence of racism is an example. Racism can
be produced by “dissonance reduction among subordinate
groups, by conceptual imperialism among dominant groups, by
faulty inferences from prototypes and salient examples, by
conceptual homologies that oppose blackness and whiteness, by
suppression and projection of superior and inferior associations,
by social scripts featuring stock characters and expectations
about ethnic groups, and by recurrent cultural narratives about
14
the American ‘savage war.’” These different cognitive tools are
mutually reinforcing. “Ideological mechanisms are the result of
bricolage and circumstance; their heterogeneity and disorder are
15
the best evidence of their historical emergence.” Their effects
can only be countered by criticism that uses other cognitive tools
of the same kind, contingent mechanisms that have been thrown
into our hands by historical circumstance.
Balkin wants to evaluate ideological effects by their justice
or injustice. Justice, he thinks, is a transcendent ideal, “an
inchoate yearning that we attempt to articulate through our
16
17
cultural constructions.” It “can never be perfectly realized,”
but it has an irresistible power just the same. It is puzzling how
this transcendent aspiration can have the anchoring effect Balkin
18
contemplates amid the world of flux that he describes. It
appears to be necessary to take it as an object of practical faith.

13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 258.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 144.
18. He writes elsewhere that the sense of justice “is an inchoate, indeterminate and
indefinite drive that acts as a goad rather than as a guide.” J.M. Balkin, Being Just With
Deconstruction, 3 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 393, 402 (1994).
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“[T]ranscendent ideals are presupposed by the rhetorical
situation of having to persuade an audience. They seem to spring
19
forth magically from the rhetorical encounter.”
But a judgment of justice or injustice does not help us
understand the mechanisms by which ideological effects operate.
Unlike earlier theorists such as Marx, Balkin assigns no distinct
etiology to pernicious ideologies. Just and unjust forms of
cultural knowledge perpetuate themselves through the same
strategies.
Balkin’s understanding of collective deliberation, David
Charny observes, is
a sort of war of all against all, a return to the state of nature,
except that the warriors are not so much individuals as the
memes that define individuals and that use them as vectors of
propagation. The public space is not a collection of rational
20
selves, but a swarm of viral particles of information.

The outcome of rhetorical contestation will necessarily be
chaotic and unpredictable. A fortiori, this is true of
constitutional contestation. What constrains constitutional law is
not a set of rules, but a set of rhetorical norms, themselves
unstable and shifting over time, that determine which moves are
legitimate. Richard Posner has observed that “thinking like a
lawyer” really means “an awareness of approximately how
plastic law is at the frontiers—neither infinitely plastic . . . nor
21
rigid and predetermined, as many laypersons think.” Balkin
agrees, and emphasizes the way in which the boundaries shift as
culture does, so that an argument regarded as crackpot and “off
22
the wall” at one time becomes accepted doctrine later on.
19. BALKIN, supra note 11, at 149.
20. David Charny, Farewell to an Idea? Ideology in Legal Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1596, 1614 (1999) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 11). Charny continues: “What rescues
this from utter bleakness is the (individually limited though collectively determinative)
power of each self to influence memetic propagation, and the celebratory sense in which
this diversity spawns ideals and aspirations that might elude a more tightly controlled
communal discourse.” Id. This celebration of the proliferation of diverse cultural forms is
also a central theme in Balkin’s approach to questions of free speech. See, e.g., Jack M.
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for
the Information Society, 79 NYU L. REV. 1 (2004).
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1990).
22. Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 309; Constitutional
Redemption, supra note 1, at 514; Framework Originalism, supra note 4, at 577, 584, 588,
605. The bald fact of endorsement by powerful political actors can shift the boundaries of
the crackpot, as when constitutional interpretations which “would have been regarded by
most lawyers and judges as off the wall” became respectable when the Supreme Court
endorsed them in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith:
The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553, 567–68 (2003)
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***
Balkin wrote in 1997, the year before Cultural Software
appeared, that “[o]ur theories of the Constitution are makeshift
attempts, reflecting the concerns of our era, but dressed up as
23
timeless claims about interpretation.” The Constitution never
really measures up to our transcendent ideal of justice. The turn
to ideal constitutionalism, which identifies the Constitution with
that transcendent ideal, is a way of coping with the cognitive
24
dissonance this produces. But even our aspirations are
historically conditioned. We can’t step out of our own skin. We
can imagine redemption, but we are fated to live in a fallen
25
world.
Balkin doesn’t talk like this any more. He’s now in the
dressing-up business himself. This is clearest in his discussion of
the question of the weight of precedent.
[S]ocial movements sometimes succeed because they correctly
see that the world has changed and that we must implement
constitutional principles differently than we did before. When
constitutional doctrine responds to their arguments, we
should value these new decisions not because they are
precedents, and not because social movements supported
them, but because these decisions better implement
26
constitutional text and principle in changing times.

[hereinafter Idolatry and Faith]. Any suspicion that Balkin himself regards legal
argument as infinitely plastic is dispelled by his appalled reaction to that decision. See
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407 (2001).
23. J.M. Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1719 (1997).
24. Id. at 1731. He is evidently influenced here by his former Texas colleague Philip
Bobbitt, who likewise denies that there is any algorithm for constitutional interpretation,
but defends the consequent indeterminacy on the basis that it “gives us a way to measure
a possible legal world against our sense of rightness, going back and forth between a
proposed interpretation and its world, and ourselves.” PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 158 (1991). Balkin frequently refers to Bobbitt’s
modalities of constitutional law, which entail indeterminacy. See, e.g., Constitutional
Redemption, supra note 1, at 483, 484, 485, 511. Robert Tsai’s important work has shown
that constitutional law is even more indeterminate than Bobbitt allows, inasmuch as it
has been significantly shaped by rhetorical moves that do not fit into any of Bobbitt’s
modalities. See ROBERT TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST
AMENDMENT CULTURE 31–32 (2008).
25. The implicit theology here is more Jewish than Christian: not only is the
Messiah’s arrival endlessly deferred, he has never been here.
26. Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 478. Smith observes that Balkin uses
a bewildering variety of verbs to describe the relation between text and principle:
“underlie,” “points to,” “embodies,” “presumes,” “adopt[s],” “enacts,” “endorses,”
“employs,” is “connected to,” “attempt[s] to embrace.” Smith, supra note 2, at 11–12.

!!!KOPPELMAN-271-WHYJACKBALKINISDISGUSTING.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

12/10/2010 10:49 AM

WHY JACK BALKIN IS DISGUSTING

183

Precedents are to be judged against the text, but the text is a
placeholder for our aspirations, which transcend any text. This is
what “better” means in the sentence just quoted. Because our
background assumptions and aspirations shift over time, the
Constitution can no more have a stable meaning than anything
else in the fluid world of cultural software. Balkin rejects “the
27
idolatry of mathematical precision in legal reasoning.” The
boundary that separates the plausible from the implausible
is the boundary that distinguishes the Rule of Law from the
arbitrary exercise of power. But if that boundary is not fixed,
but moveable, and if that boundary can be moved through
politics, or through the assertions of powerful people who
seek to maintain their power, the certainty of our faith in law
28
might well be shaken.

So in his recent constitutional writings, Balkin is gentle
about delivering this bad news. I suspect that this is why,
contrary to his own wry professional advice to legal academics to
cite yourself whenever possible, he has hardly ever cited Cultural
Software in his constitutional work, and a few years ago stopped
29
doing so altogether.
This hasn’t kept his critics from feeling that Balkin has
taken something precious from them. Orin Kerr declares that
Balkin “attempts to eliminate the rhetorical power of originalist
arguments by making essentially everything an originalist
30
argument.” Ed Whelan, noting the “near-infinite malleability”
of Balkin’s theory, argues that “a theory that can explain
31
anything really explains nothing.” Matthew Franck writes that
Balkin has “succeeded only in destroying everything about the
edifice of originalism except the sign that hung on the building,
which he picked up from the rubble and slapped on the construct
27. Idolatry and Faith, supra note 22, at 562.
28. Id. at 568.
29. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 856–59 (1996). A Westlaw search of “au(balkin) & ‘cultural
software’” in the JLR (journals and law reviews) database yielded four articles citing the
book, the most recent from 2005. When asked about this reticence, Prof. Balkin
responded: “There are many connections between Early Balkin and Later Balkin, but
they are esoteric and none of them are particularly useful to readers.” Personal
communication, June 25, 2009. Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain.
30. Orin Kerr, comment to Jack Balkin, Soul-Killer, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 11,
2009, 8:40 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/08/jack-balkin-sou.html.
31. Ed Whelan, Reply to Balkin on Abortion and Original Meaning—Part 1, BENCH
MEMOS, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2007, 1:34 PM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51395/reply-balkin-abortion-and-original-meaningmdash-part-1/ed-whelan.
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32

hitherto known as the ‘living Constitution.’” Conversations
with other constitutional scholars have shown me that these
comments are only the tip of the iceberg. The sheer outrage that
Balkin has provoked demands explanation.
***
The resistance to Balkin’s indeterminacy claim—a
resistance he understands, which is why he’s so coy about the
depth of the indeterminacy—operates in much the same way as
the cognitive content of the emotion of disgust. Research in
psychology, Martha Nussbaum reports, finds that disgust “has a
complex cognitive content, which focuses on the idea of
33
incorporation of a contaminant.” People will not eat food that
has even briefly touched an unacceptable object, even if that
object is harmless, such as a sterilized cockroach. “The
ideational content of disgust is that the self will become base or
contaminated by ingestion of the substance that is viewed as
34
offensive.” The objects of disgust tend to focus on animals and
animal waste products. “[T]he motivating idea has to do with our
interest in policing the boundary between ourselves and
35
nonhuman animals, or our own animality.”
The core objects of disgust are those that remind us of our
animal vulnerability and mortality. This emotion appears to be
an inevitable part of civilization, but, Nussbaum observes, it has
a dangerous tendency to be associated with group subordination.
“[T]hroughout history, certain disgust properties—sliminess, bad
smell, stickiness, decay, foulness—have repeatedly and
monotonously been associated with, indeed projected onto,
groups by reference to whom privileged groups seek to define
their superior human status. Jews, women, homosexuals,
untouchables, lower-class people—all these are imagined as
36
tainted by the dirt of the body.” Such projected disgust is
contrasted with an ideal of the pure, hard, uncontaminated,

32. Matthew Franck, Jumping to Conclusions, BENCH MEMOS, NATIONAL REVIEW
ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2007 4:58 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51392/
jumping-conclusions/matthew-j-franck.
33. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW 87 (2004) [hereinafter HIDING FROM HUMANITY]. See also MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 200–06, 220–
22, 346–50 (2001).
34. HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 88.
35. Id. at 89.
36. Id. at 108.
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impenetrable, invulnerable self—a dangerous delusion, precisely
37
because it tends to produce such projections.
The hard impenetrable constitutional theory, one that is
self-sufficient and not vulnerable to penetration by discretion
38
and contingency, is a similar self-protective delusion. The
continuing appeal of originalism when it presents itself as a
39
program for radical transformation of judicial practice has
become increasingly puzzling as it has become clear that it is as
40
contingent and contestable as any of its rivals. The disgust that
Balkin elicits offers an answer to the puzzle.
Steven D. Smith, who understands the role of faith in
constitutional theory better than most, laments that after Balkin,
originalism is no longer available as a distinct approach to
further (or at least attempt to further) the worthy
purposes . . . for which it was devised—namely, constraining
courts in history-grounded ways, and preserving the ability of
democratic institutions to enact constitutional provisions with
relatively definite and fixed meanings. That seems a
regrettable loss (even for those who doubt originalism’s
41
ability ultimately to provide what it promises).

Smith is nostalgic for that lost paradise, even though he
knows that it never really existed. He flirts with (but cannot
bring himself to surrender to) the bad faith of fundamentalism,
which rejects modernity even though it is itself a product and
42
reflection of modernity.
37. Id. at 107–15. It would be delusional even if it did not produce these ideological
effects, insofar as it rests on denial of one’s own mortality. See Cathy R. Cox, Jamie L.
Goldenberg, Tom Pyszczynski & David Weise, Disgust, Creatureliness and the
Accessibility of Death-Related Thoughts, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 494 (2007). As it
happens, disgust sensitivity is associated with conservative political attitudes. Yoel Inbar,
David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom, Conservatives Are More Easily Disgusted Than
Liberals, 23 COGNITION & EMOTION 714 (2009); Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, Joshua
Knobe & Paul Bloom, Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9
EMOTION 435 (2009).
38. Bobbitt observes that in Robert Bork’s shift from libertarianism to originalism,
what persists is the “yearning to escape from mere politics to a decisive world of rules.”
Bobbitt, supra note 24, at 102.
39. Some originalists disclaim any such ambition. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
40. On the varieties of originalism, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living
Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009). On the other hand, originalism is not infinitely
plastic. It cannot support an argument that misrepresents its sources or conceals
pertinent evidence. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment
Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2009).
41. Smith, supra note 2, at 15.
42. On the bad faith of fundamentalism, see PETER L. BERGER, THE HERETICAL
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Balkin’s invocation of originalism simultaneously invokes
and undermines that fixity and stability. “The tropes of fidelity
to text and principle, and of their restoration and redemption in
history are not simply fables we tell themselves,” he writes.
“These tropes allow us to see the Constitution as a
transgenerational project that connects different generations and
43
identifies them as a single people stretched out over time.” This
is like saying that God is not simply a fable because the idea of
God allows the church to see itself as a single community. It
doesn’t answer the question. The community would very much
like to know whether the object of its faith is real. Eric Posner is
right that Balkin is “trying to figure out what the PR angle of
44
originalism is and how to duplicate it.” The problem is like the
quandary of atheists who want to invoke religious language
because it symbolically expresses human aspirations, even
though whatever power the language has depends on the sense
45
that God is a reality and not merely a metaphor.
Balkin isn’t merely faking it, because he thinks that the
transcendent ideal of justice can endure any amount of
deconstruction. “[E]ven the faithful, even the person who
believes in God fervently and devotedly, knows that the works
of religion, the products of religion, the practices and
conventions of religion, are made by mortal human beings, by
communities of belief that extend and evolve over time,
46
sometimes over many centuries.” In the same way, even the
person who firmly believes in the rule of law knows that it is
made by fallible mortals. “So even the most devoted face the
dangers inherent in faith, and they face them not because they
are agnostic but precisely because they have given their lives
47
over to faith.” The framers displayed their faith by codifying
IMPERATIVE: CONTEMPORARY POSSIBILITIES OF RELIGIOUS AFFIRMATION 61–86
(1979).
43. Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 522.
44. Quoted in Ari Shapiro, Conservatives Have ‘Originalism’; Liberals Have...?,
NPR ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (June 23, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=105439966&ps=cprs.
45. See Simon Blackburn, Religion and Respect, in PHILOSOPHERS WITHOUT
GODS: MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 179 (Louise M. Antony ed.,
2007).
46. Idolatry and Faith, supra note 22, at 558.
47. Id. Further evidence that doubt is not equivalent to faking it is provided by
Pope Benedict XVI:
[B]oth the believer and the unbeliever share, each in his own way, doubt and
belief, if they do not hide from themselves and from the truth of their being.
Neither can quite escape either doubt or belief; for the one, faith is present
against doubt; for the other, through doubt and in the form of doubt. It is the
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abstract ideals such as equal protection. When we today offer
our best understanding of those ideals, we manifest the same
faith. That is a kind of originalism. But it’s not the kind that
conservative originalists were hoping for.
Balkin thinks that faith is possible without endorsing
implausible factual claims about the world. But human beings
evidently vary in the degree to which they need to believe such
48
claims in order to sustain their faith. The preacher may be
vividly aware of the facts that make faith difficult, but that
doesn’t obligate him to talk about them in every sermon.
We live in a world in which the Constitution isn’t really a
higher standard outside ourselves. It is a human construct,
legitimated, if at all, by things unseen. We are, perhaps, all that
the Constitution is constituted out of. Its innards are as slimy as
ours. How disgusting is that?

basic pattern of man’s destiny only to be allowed to find the finality of his
existence in this unceasing rivalry between doubt and belief, temptation and
certainty. Perhaps in precisely this way doubt, which saves both sides from being
shut up in their own worlds, could become an avenue of communication. It
prevents both from enjoying complete self-satisfaction; it opens up the believer
to the doubter and the doubter to the believer; for one, it is his share in the fate
of the unbeliever; for the other, the form in which belief remains nevertheless a
challenge to him.
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 46–47 (rev. ed.
2004).
48. See Andrew Koppelman, Naked Strong Evaluation, 56 DISSENT 105 (Winter
2009) (book review of CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007)).

